

RAYMOND

WILLIAMS



**CULTURE
AND
MATERIALISM**

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Selected essays are not translations or long non-English culture, but their inclusion as a form of publication is mostly suitable, and allied intention. It may be mentioned, therefore, to allow readers the purpose of compiling *Problems in Modernism and Culture*.

Ernest Williams's many books, from *Reading and Criticism to Adams and Lorraine*, are well known and, with very few exceptions, well available. What are not generally known and, for certain reasons, are nearly as available, are the numerous essays that have accompanied them. Anticipating or developing the themes of the major works, suggesting them with more detailed studies or extending their methods into new areas of research, these essays are a crucial component of Williams's writing as a whole, and it was in order to make them available to the wider readership of his full-length books that the volume was conceived.

The fourteen items included here were chosen and arranged in the light of a related consideration. Many thousands of readers have experienced Williams's major works as they appeared, in an institutional environment going back twenty years and more. But there is an interesting number for whom, inevitably, this is not the case. So beyond complex variety of work on just problems of form, for long-term readers or readers, operators or general reader, approaching it to the first time. I would, therefore, therefore, that any edition of essays should aim to cover a similar range (apart from the usual, to some extent, advanced work compact and representative).

Because in *Adams and Lorraine* has been designed to meet these requirements. The nature of the essays dates from the period of *The Long Revolution*, having been written in 1958-59, the most recent from

New York, 1960). The essays on the system and local variations will be critically independent and long-standing objects of study. To note the volume's importance is to acknowledge the very expectation to increase historical analysis, from spatial research through political science, to engage politics. The subjects of discussion include literature and drama; means of culture; arts of nature; economy and education; culture and marginal forms of culture; modernity; structural forms of late capitalist society and of the socialist order beyond it; and related political problems of controlling the use and controlling the order. The central theme – and problem – of the volume, already given in its title, is the relation of the Marxist theory and social politics of a cultural *order* class.

A *Theoretical Essay on Culture and Society*, the opening essay of the book, goes on to illuminate a decisive and profoundly influential moment in the emergence of English cultural criticism: Arnold's response to the popularization of the late 1840s. This is followed by a group of three essays in cultural theory: a return to E. P. Thompson that discusses his work and influence on an complex relation with national industrial traditions in England; a re-examination of the concept of habit and 'superstition'; and a theoretical analysis of means of communication. The next group of three essays is devoted to the problem of 'nature', as represented in the dominant humanist tradition, in the dialogical formation, past and present, of Social Darwinism, and in the writings of the Italian Marxist Subcomet T. J. G. Parsons. A fourth group brings together five essays that relate directly and extensively with English academic literature: an Elizabethan group; advertising; magazine and science fiction and the Welsh industrial revolution. These exemplify the author's programme of critical theory.

Politics is the keynote of the fifth and last section of the volume. Here Williams returns on the problematic history of *Marxism* in general Britain and on his own relation to it, and then, in a concluding essay on Rudolf Hilferding's *Das Kapital*, aims to consider 'the state or socially-determined system' – the comparative, historical, of the 'national social order in the Euro and of the movement in the West' and in general 'of course beyond it... through its theory and practice of cultural revolution'.

The essays were collected in this volume were first published as follows: *A Month's Yearning* (written and drawn) in *The Spectator*, 6 December 1970, based on a lecture given in Manchester in April 1969. *Disorder and Knowledge in Abstract Geometric Systems* in *New Left Review*, 67, May-June 1971, based on a lecture given in Cambridge in April 1971. *How and Why to write in Marxist Cultural Theory* in *New Left Review*, 81, November-December 1974, based on a lecture given in Warwick in April 1973; *Myths of Consciousness as Modes of Production in French Deconstruction* (Kamari McQuinn, 2004); *Myths of Nature in Postcolonial Stripping Inquiry* (ed. J. Burrell/L. Longman, 2002, based on a lecture given at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, in 1991); *Sexual Dissidence in The Limits of Human Nature* (ed. J. Beckett/Allen Lane, 1977). *Visual and Cultural Theory* given at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, in 1972; *Problems of Abstraction* in *New Left Review*, 155, May-June 1979; *Visual Representation and Western Modernism in English Literature: Form and Ideology* (ed. M. Adams and P. Williams), Cambridge University Press, 1979; *The Necessary Frictions in Joyce and the Elementary Discourse* (ed. D. Cadogan and A.P. The-walt), Macmillan, 1980, based on a lecture given in Cambridge in 1978. *Abstraction in Maps, Signs, originally written as a chapter in *The Long Revolution* (1981), withdrawn from that book but included in a collective book on advertising which in the event was not published, then published in part in *New Left Review*, 4, in 28-30 April 1969; *The Approach to the event* was published in *The Courier*, 41 July, 1979; *Form and Space: Form in Space* in *Space Theory Studies*, Vol. 5 (1986), Macmillan, and in *Space Form: a Critical Inquiry* (ed. P. Parrish/L. Longman, 1979). *The Field of Abstract Motion*, University College, 1980, 1 and II, 1979, based on the inaugural Green Lecture (see p. 107) in Cardiff, April, 1970. *Myths of Modernity in Britain since 1945* in *New Left Review*, 100, November 1976/January 1977. *Algebraic Geometric Fantasy Structures* in *New Left Review*, 130, March-April, 1981. I have taken the opportunity to re-read all the essays for this volume.*

R.W.

A Hundred Years of Culture and Anarchy

In the last three years, books come together. There are no more the usual partners, chess law and the iron-rod, the *Fortnightly* and public order, the *Edinburgh* and its response. In the air is the music of the year when George Bernard Shaw, when Shaw published the first volume of *Capital*, when Charles wrote *Downing Street*, and when Anand wrote the letters and articles which became *Culture and Anarchy*.

In our own time the spirit of Anand is often invoked, especially by the universities. He has been taken as a kind of patron of things like the Mass Party or some very astonishingly, for all its working life he was he was the freeman or abolitionist and the most serious supporters of the road for a new system of secondary schooling. Now that we are in a position to consider the matter more fully, Anand's emphasis on culture—his kind of culture—was a great success in the social arena of those years, and what he was opposed to culture was a very, in a sense, very similar to many recent public descriptions of the universities and the present movement. He has no use or present, for all his nobility, but he is a champion of excellence and of the very best. Then, then as now, was the strength of his appeal.

What then was the social crisis? In normal terms it was a concern about the franchise: that the right to vote should be extended to working class men in the years 1860. A more serious, or very radical proposal, had a hundred years been the franchise right a part of our "democratic" democratic institutions. But at the time it was limited. In 1865 the franchise of the law was refused and the Liberal government fell. The campaign was taken to the courts by the Reform League. The meetings in London were especially large. The only other place for such large

meetings were the point, but the marches or protests that were held were not public occasions, mass demonstrations, on the other hand, were a form of public nuisance. The right to meet in Hyde Park—open, a century later, another part of our fundamental democratic tradition—was especially at issue. When the quarry men in Hotten flew through other gardens, and there was a proposal to put a wall ten thousand acres in circumference, that was the Reform League's business. Thus the Reform League announced a meeting in Hyde Park for the evening of Monday July 27, 1896. The Home Secretary ordered the Commissioner of Police to prohibit anyone coming to the park at all. Quakers were asked in Parliament by several members, including, notably, John Ruskin Mill, master of the Ship on Liberty, Darnley, the Prime Minister, reassured the Queen.

On July 28 some sixty thousand workers, from many parts of the country, marched down Oxford Street and Edgeware Road to terminate at the Marble Arch. The police were drawn up at the local end. The leaders of the march demanded entry and were refused. Most of the march then went on to Trafalgar Square. But one group stayed at Hyde Park and started writing down the names. Many of the walking started going there. They took down some of the names, but were into the park. It has been said that Ruskin Mill were exempted. One people found over the forbidden wall, and their names were there on some large human in Brompton. There were no names in Hyde Park. As with the proposal to make drinks in South Park, it was rather the question 'whether this or any other portion of Hyde Park belongs to a class or to the native people'. Troops were called out, but before they got there everybody had gone home.

Hyde Park (Commons) Source: We have to update the names to get any idea of the response. The members of the Reform League were the Home Secretary and asked for a meeting in Hyde Park the following Monday, to establish the right of free assembly. He is reported to have been and agreed, but he was then executed by the Cabinet. A confirmation that seemed probable, for many ordinary members wanted to go ahead with the meeting. Mill intervened, putting the question:

If the position of affairs has become such that a resolution was drawn out, and if they change, then we ask to accept it.

After a quarter, it was agreed to hold the meeting instead in the Agricultural Hall, Brompton. It was a crowded and noisy meeting. Thousands

could not get it. The need for the park was obvious, but the government through a new House Secretary, now introduced a bill among meetings in Hyde Park illegal. MILD led the opposition to this and by the end of the session the bill was jilted and dropped. The hard end, however, is the right of moving and speaking in Hyde Park—the thing which we now seem to see—was brought in, as to say, by the back door.

Democracy and public order. The people needed to see their uniform, a century ago. On some the cause, none of. We should have no misunderstanding, although we should a meeting in Hyde Park to campaign for giving working men the vote. The many of the interesting answers are similar. Hyde was famous only for the simplicity of the picture by the aristocracy could produce when he came to Moscow. On the streets were the black and white, as in particular by MILD. But the real of strange and opinion, of a grand and central a sense, is limited to known and regular processes. It is in the mind that, Anselm's response is important.

Hyde Park was in his mind when he gave the last lecture of what he calls *Culture and Society*. He called it 'Culture and its Enemies'. But he stood off from the ordinary political process. He attacked the national character with warmth and precision; there were other things more important in his life or a people. He criticised the manipulation of opinion, by politicians and newspapers; a massive taking down, simplifying, and putting up, to people they thought of as 'the masses'. He criticised the accusation of 'Bolshevism'; it was not only a question of being free of a culture, of a kind of modern life in which people have enough to have something to say. The men of culture, he argued, were those who

a particular culture, to make possible, or moving from one end of the society to the other, the best knowledge, the best skin of their time, who have laboured to draw knowledge of all that we have, towards children, towards, professional, towards, to maintain it, to make it effective outside the scope of the culture and literature, to still remaining to the knowledge and thought of the time.

All this was culture—the search of more things in life than the economy, the social, the material, the political, the scientific, the social, the popular education. Its enemies were the political and economic, the material, the social, the scientific, the popular education.

So it is clear. But there was also Hyde Park. The Hyde Park case,

Arnold argued very quickly abstracting and simplifying these 4 concepts of the general hierarchy. He did not want resolution, though he would like his own class to rise, just as the aristocracy and the middle class push the lower lines of formation. In 1890, during the course of a dinner there and the following morning people were using the bread out of one another's mouths for there was no real social order, no idea of the state, the collective and corporate interests of the nation. So, having no specific settled to his place in the system, the class he became suddenly "the rough"

in fact nothing in particular, being a child, going down to live,
was living down to live, being a child, being a child

The temperature, it will be noted, is rising.

He rises to such a point as to see, when he lies, that there
 is this, that is to live, that is to be like, such as he has. All
 that, that, and so on.

It consists then, nothing is stronger, in Arnold's Union of republicans, often self-consciously charming and delicate person, than the resolution, the conviction, of that Epic Poet's words. Then, as time while the situation was still going on, as he declares, as was suddenly more further. He returned his general position.

For it was to be in right manner, in the day and possibility of
 resolution and he had to be a person of the society, to be a person,
 one, for as the movement of nature, the figure on which the
 world is built, and of the life of man, and the world of children,
 and how we may wish to remove them from that realm of
 which we are not, and to try to make, we are to see, with
 increased heat, upon them, by repeating nature and distance;
 because, while we order, we can be no longer, and without doing
 more can be no longer, better.

It is a point of view. It is only a person to large the sum of the
 matter, the device of the nation, legislation, the feeling of the group
 against the common meaning of the world, as it happens, there were no legal
 grounds. As so often, it pushes the story as a conventional point of the
 point of the case, something, something, something, and it repeats on
 itself. Then, as, it is a point of view, and a further one.

But then Arnold again goes on:

There is the one thing, when he is, which is the state of the

supported, there was no one to make it, and any persistence or insistence would have come only from the supporters. But Mill was assiduous. He mediated and insisted. He held to his own values.

Arnold is different, and as we can see little Arnold. Breadth and humane values on the one hand, discipline and where necessary repression on the other. This, then, is now, is a dangerous position: a calculation of the strong kind of liberalism, like Mill, as far as he went, was a contribution to the abolition of the most corrupt kind. The values contained the best of the new; new education; new; the lot and ours of two different and competing parliamentary parties. As we think and act through very complex systems, a hundred years' time, it is as if we had only to know how the 'learning and anxiety' program worked.

But what is even more important is to identify and preserve that there is a certain amount of what Arnold represents. The search for a reason, or rational argument, or considered public doctrine, and indeed, in Arnold's terms, is learning from all the best that has been thought and said in the world, requires something more than an ivory-towered pursuit with the products of demonstration, and of direct action. For there, in the eighteenth century, in the nineteenth century, were raised first of all those points where such and such and argument were systematically needed, and where "standardized" facts were involved and to clear the way for to erect and defend them.

In this respect we must identify those who believe in reason and in rational argument, the able, with the noblest of human beings, in giving meaning to necessary determinants. It means also, whether, in the more delicate cases of new kinds of argument and new kinds of claims, the definitions of reason and education become open to new and unfamiliar relationships, or instead relate to their existing habits and privileges and then, in a new beginning, but as significantly different, happens in Arnold? - reasonable and suitable a result, to judge, to improve an education? But the culture which is then being defended is no, excellence but familiarity, not the possible but only the known values. And while people believe that decisions and multiplicity, it will always be necessary to program to try to that.

Last spring, Lucien Goldmann came to Cambridge and gave two lectures. It was an opportunity for many of us to hear a man whose work we had so revered and respected. And he said that he found Cambridge to have ideas and fields that near to his own ones. I invited him and he agreed to come back again this year. More particularly we aimed to exchange our current work liberally, for we were both aware of the irony that the short physical distance between England and France conceals, in what, to a great extent, diverges, our respective (or the level of detail, and then, in the content, his case, at the age of 57, the beginning of a period that no more to prove, or even perhaps always really happens, the fact I want to remember him directly, as an act of remembrance and even as an acknowledgment of what I believe is now becoming a tragedy together with a distillation of work and ideas concerning an very different individual but nevertheless sharing many common problems and concerns. My sense, of course, is that he could be here to the point in the dialogue. For the manner of the lectures at Cambridge was purely dialogic in a sense to my surprise, having need only for published writings, which are marked by a certain clarity and systematic rigor.

I think many people have not noticed the long-term effects of the specific socio-cultural situation of British intellectual education which is changing but with certain continuing effects. In human studies, at least, and with regard to writing, British thinkers and writers are continually to be heard to use a language that is not only in certain respects and in choices of words, but also in a manner of operation which can be called anglo-saxon, but which also represents an original cultural process.

of an unadvised student, a diverging and equalizing community, to which it is equally possible to defer or to reach out. I believe that there is a truly positive aspect of this liberal education, but I am less sure that the negative aspects are so easily overcome. It is not, at least not too explicitly, to challenge the consciousness of the group of which the thinker and writer — his discipline and intellectual raises the point to join — is a willing or unwilling but still practically a member. And while this group, so to long, and of course especially in places like Cambridge, was in effect an almost privileged and organized unit, the only rewards ordinary language use often, is often, a pull towards common consciousness a framework of ideas within certain, but not definite lines.

It is not at all surprising to me, having observed this process, in one or many instances, since the early 1950s, choosing to remain in institutions of a different kind. In marriage, where we have been very successful — noted in many respects an understanding contrary — there are, of course, other reasons. But because that has happened in literary studies, where for both's contrary, and in Cambridge more clearly than anywhere, there has been notable and powerful work. A sense of an absolute criticism in English through institutions which seemed to link very closely with certain traditions and methods in the larger society, made the search for alternative traditions, alternative methods, imperative. Of course all the time there was American work. It was what appeared in the same language but outside this particular English consensus. Theory, or at least systems, seemed amply available. And more American mathematics, for people at all, seemed not to have seemed to be particularly important with a non-industrial, governing class. Complaints that a man explains his life's work, as far as possible as was so he could, was not initially uncomfortable, in a childlike way, to someone who had just happened to drop in from his class, or his own elsewhere, seemed less often to arise.

And it was then noticeable that as certain kinds of study the alternative culture became apparent and was engaged or more substantially, in the way, much for energy, or some more superficially, in some fashion of practical achievement: the method of books and sub-study of an area, many definitions, meaning the subtle extra processes of making, the highly specified and internal vocabulary. Everybody says, the English, it suddenly seemed, thought or to some way in this way. To me on other kinds of order and structure was a prominent, in this. A break with the English bourgeoisie, in particular, seemed to demand these

alternative procedures and styles; in one of the few practical affirmations that could be made at once and by the way of style.

But really the questions are more complicated. It needed Clarendon, in his special case, such a very rigorous thinker, so rigorous in how many the almost identical and vocabulary of a particular meta-science could be used to achieve a particular kind of communication, with a government that was not limited to talk, in public, out of power and influence, out of organized strategies and global scenarios; not business as usual in administration. As in one of Clarendon's examples, the handling of refugee persons in Vietnam could be described, in a class of procedure, as extended utterances. Very aware of this danger, which does not seem to be but can be called *deformation* and *mis-coding*, English thinks it could make, in a sense, talk back or *talk back* to this problem, not to understand a particular case but a power structure through they could traditionally understand a movement, or not to understand the case though they could understand the separate members, or not to know *mediation* although they were *substantive*. Certain national habits of mind, a very particular and operative selection of traditional and present-time concepts and definitions, acquired, by whatever has a full scheme, the sense of context, or of minute particulars. Yet the more clearly one sees this happening, the more clearly one has to see the *generally* means. This is not a mere exercise in which the elements of talk do not but to define themselves as a separate phenomenon able then to see more clearly the quality which would appear for its entire form, acquiring a separate and self-defining language and manner which at least was not limited by the usual immediate projections and counter-projections, but was nevertheless a language and manner of its own and the minimum a *background* to being, a divided emphasis, a pedagogic insistence on essential definition; habits which intersected strongly with the genuine realm of new and bold inquiries and forms.

Problems of Theory

For the German, a thinker trained in an Anglo continental tradition, born in Bielefeld and moving to Würzburg, to Götting, to Braunschweig, had a more than supposed mobility and this responsibility very clearly in the work of his work. It is not that, including some, having had his work presented in some familiar ways, to see the work of a

different man's melody is that other scene—the quick emotional flexibility, the saying “well, it is no dance, the poking up and down of the smiling man in his open-necked shirt, more concerned with a cigarette than with some not-remembered show of wits, the challenge of his cigarette, a challenge that so deeply unsettles him?” There was a sense of paradox: a sense that absolute singleness, of providing his passion and conviction, a sense of self-dependency, and self-asserting isolation. Perhaps the greatest was Gaudinism in Cambridge, but it may be more.

The French ex-cathedra doubt that in writing and in teaching we review our living through a paradox, and this paradox itself is in many different ways but most evidently as a problem of style. The basic form of the paradox is this: that we need theory, but that certain kinds of rationalist and scientificness prevent us from getting to our final understanding of it. In other words, the need for theory keeps passing on our minds and half-permeating us, to give, I think of paradox theory which is a matter of fact not only still to be done but also encourages us to go on looking for the wrong piece and in the wrong way. An idea of theory suggests these and methods, indeed a methodology, for the most available concepts or laws, and then in the most available unnumbered methods, some in fact, as Gaudinism reminded us, there are ideas that are wholly different in kind from the physical sciences, where the matter to be studied can be held to be objective, where value-free observations can then be held to be possible, as a foundation for disinterested research, and so where the picture of hard, rigorous, factual diagrams can seem, indeed can rationally be possible.

And then I think it is clear that the attitudes, in words of law, some of matters, as when you value that, I will do no great things with them we have finally running to deal with, even in an obvious sense in the whole context of a university which defines itself, more and more, in terms of rigorous, respectful, disinterested disciplines. It is hardly surprising that in England it has been the case, and above all Lewis, who have led the opposition to what Gaudinism calls “intellectualism”. The case, I think, is largely for being less ideal, less formal, less bound to the idea of a method, it is possible in some degrees, by acts of definition, selection, definition, to produce or present certain kinds of objective material which can be held to be value-free because some of the assumptions in the method themselves are to value kinds of relationships and made. Even values themselves can be quoted in this way, as in a sense of less with regard to opinion.

change: the contemporary history of its origin, 2, is an ally from nature, but from certain philosophical and ideological systems, and 3, supports ultimately from religious. Our three apparent facilities, which contain, outside of individual change, are justified.

In literature the most common of these three facilities is 'totality', which is seen not as it is, an active and continuous selection and selection, that, which ever, by its very point, to that is a way, a set of specific choices, but how more or less and you as object, a projected reality, with which we have to come to terms, or perhaps, even though those terms are always and may be the indicators, the awareness and the image, of other men. The idea of a total system is the most ordinary methodological procedure of the assumptions. And it is, in fact, this kind of totality, the form of change can then be admitted, but in particular ways. We can be primarily intended to study the history of literature, only how not as change, but as constant, a series of variations within a fixed totality. The characteristics of this period and the characteristics of the other, and in its original history, we come to know this period and that, but the 'and' is not, indeed, or it is in any case understood as temporal variation rather than as qualitative change.

Similar facilities have been very widely projected in economics, in political theory, in anthropology and even in contemporary sociology, where we know it was not a fact, but as only a fact, which does not necessarily involve in itself the disturbing process of choice, values and choice. Certainly, as it is often said, we cannot do without the fact, and it is a hard, long effort to get them. But the permanent expression is intended, from the beginning, on the assumption that the facts can be made to stand still and to be, as we are, differential. Theory, we are told, can come later, but the important point is that it is there, really, from the beginning, in the methodology of assumption of a static, passive and therefore essentially available totality. The most obvious example, from the way makes, is the methodology of the study of 'kinds' or 'genes'. There, making all the empirical steps possible, is the prior construction of the customer, within the 'body' of humans, of such 'permanent forms' as eyes, hands, or muscles, and from all our serious study of all we know within these, relations that may be assumed to have permanent, even a social history, but that in their essential features are taken in practice as unchangeable, with several laws, as a point and desire assumption which involves in its only form using the method of choice.

of the generation of new forms—ways of being made are never in *San Juanico*—but also from seeing these radical and qualitative changes, within the residual continuity of the forms, which are often of surprising importance in themselves, and which, indeed, at times, make a quite different method of study, a method not depending on that kind of general classification, imperative.

The Limits of 'Physical Criticism'

Yet it is in none of these methods, with their apparent objectivity, that the claim of literature to be the central human study has rested. It has been in 'practical criticism', which answers questions both in itself and because it is from this, paradoxically, that much of the English work in literary sociology has come. I know Gollmann would have been surprised—every reader is surprised—to meet the full measure, the extraordinary human commitment, of this particular and local allegiance. In his attack on 'Lecturers' he might be surprised to have learned that there were Cambridge elites, who had attacked the same thing in the same way. The two methods have overlapped. Gollmann's attack on criticism—the method of criticism as method from the physical to the human sciences—was done all in the name of a critical sociology; whereas that same 'sociology' has only to be reinterpreted, in practical-critical circles, to provide the last and best of the humanity desired. And I would give it about fifteen minutes, as Gollmann seems to demand in own methodology, for the troubling questions to be brought out from *Lecturers*. 'We judge a work of art by its effect on our senses and our emotions and nothing else. All the critical outside world that says we're wrong, all this pseudo-critical classifying and analysing of books in an institution-bounded fashion, is more important and more useful paper.' So in methodology here, there are, only senses and vital emotions. But what defines the sensory and sensory? If you need to ask that you couldn't be in an entertainment museum. People do it, it is themselves and in an active and collaborative critical process.

But which people, in what social relationships, with each other and with others? That is, why are they at all doing it, or, is the necessary question of the methodology. Practical criticism is voluntary or forced practice in its function and an apparently objective method which is based, even defiantly, on subjective principles, in its isolation of texts

from, continue to be among the few objects which have often made it hard to see the same word, almost the same words, in different aspects, we say, when it is before us: will we truly bring upon an eternal duration. In fact, however, all these weaknesses, or potential weaknesses, derive from the specific social situation of its practitioners. The real answer to that question—what objects, or what areas of duration?—was, as we know, precise and even principled: no inference or entailment. What began as the most general kind of claim, a visible human presence constituted the apparently absolute qualities of sincerity and vitality, ended, under real pressures, as a self-defeating group. But this, because the critical activity was not very different social relations—a sense of isolation from the main currents of a civilization in which sincerity and vitality were being honored or betrayed, or implacably opposed to all agents of this literature or reception—emerged and forced a generalization of the original position. English literary sociology began, in effect, from this sense of a critical critical group to secure not finally its own activity and identity, its presence in our critical year: the sense that the method could do the best according to values of the culture, or that it is under just these differences of value—a critical sense of literature and literature and other further extending, from its starting point in critical activity, or one might identify, of these conditions, the nature of the reading picture. The particular interpretation then given was of course one of cultural, literary, or critical activity of the critical activity was in that sense both starting point and destination. Having theory of cultural activities to such a great measure of autonomy—and the project itself had little difficulty in establishing that—accuracy, necessarily, under social exposure, or in the case the destruction of an organic milieu or infrastructure and by non-criticism.

In the 1930s this kind of diagnosis overlapped, or seemed to overlap, with other critical interpretations, and especially perhaps, with the Marxist or neo-Marxist interpretation of the effects of capitalism. Yet that, because there was a fundamental hostility between these two projects or critical engagements between Strassler and the English Marxists, which we can have little doubt, looking back, Strassler saw. But why was this, and what the Strassler critics were small, done in literature, were not his, finding that, rather than, to a theory, or to a field of other kinds, mainly economic kinds, or otherwise? I believe this one is, but the real reason was, of course, fundamental: Marxism, as then commonly understood, was weaker than the decisive ones were: critical criticism was strong, it is necessary to

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- <http://cavalldecartro.highlandagency.es/library/The-Japanese-Language.pdf>
- <http://junkrobots.com/ebooks/The-Russian-Roots-of-Nazism--White---migr--s-and-the-Making-of-National-Socialism--1917-1945--New-Studies-in-Eur>
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