



# ISABELL LOREY STATE OF INSECURITY

GOVERNMENT OF THE PRECARIOUS

 VERSO  
FUTURES

WITH A FOREWORD BY  
JUDITH BUTLER

*The law of the innermost form of the essay is heresy.*

– Theodor Adorno

Verso Futures is a series of essay-length philosophical and political interventions by both emerging and established writers and thinkers from around the world. Each title in the series addresses the outer limits of political and social possibility.

Also available in Verso Futures:

*The Future* by Marc Augé

*Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide* by Franco 'Bifo' Berardi

*Déjà Vu and the End of History* by Paolo Virno

---

# State of Insecurity

Government of the Precarious

Isabell Lorey

Translated by Aileen Derieg

With a Foreword by Judith Butler



VERSO

London • New York

First published in English by Verso 2015

---

Translation © Aileen Derieg 2015

First published as *Die Regierung der Prekären*

© Isabell Lorey 2012

Foreword © Judith Butler 2015

All rights reserved

The moral rights of the authors have been asserted

**Verso**

UK: 6 Meard Street, London W1F 0EG

US: 20 Jay Street, Suite 1010, Brooklyn, NY 11201

[www.versobooks.com](http://www.versobooks.com)

Verso is the imprint of New Left Books

ISBN-13: 978-1-78168-596-9 (PB)

ISBN-13: 978-1-78168-595-2 (HC)

eISBN-13: 978-1-78168-597-6 (US)

eISBN-13: 978-1-78168-714-7 (UK)

**British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data**

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

v3.1

*Cover*

*Title Page*

*Copyright*

*Foreword by Judith Butler*

**The Government of the Precarious: An Introduction**

1. Precariousness and Precarity
2. Biopolitical Governmentality
3. Welfare State and Immunization
4. Precarization as an Instrument of Governing
5. Virtuosity and the Post-Fordist Public Sphere
6. Care Crisis and Care Strike
7. Exodus and Constituting

*Acknowledgements*

*References*

By Judith Butler

The important contribution of this thoughtful work is to let us understand finally that precarity is not a passing or episodic condition, but a new form of regulation that distinguishes this historical time. When one claims that some populations are more precarious than others, and tries to explain that difference, one is left with the task of explaining in what precisely precarity consists, where it begins and ends, and how we understand its scope and its mechanisms. In fact, we can only identify the instances by seeking recourse to its most general form, and this leads us to a consideration of how precarity has itself become a regime, a hegemonic mode of being governed, and governing ourselves. Lorey's book allows us to consider the emergence of a neoliberal form of regulation and power that is at once prefigured by Foucault and exceeds his own theory of power. The text clearly relies on Foucault for many important considerations, especially the understanding of power as it produces a subject as well as its relationship with itself. But it also introduces a new question: how do we understand precarity and its pervasive sense of 'insecurity' as a dense site of power in subject formation? In other words, how do we understand the organization of 'security' under neoliberal conditions as requiring and inducing precarity as a mode of life, as an indefinite trajectory, as the organizing principle for the process by which we are governed and by which we come to govern ourselves?

Lorey's book works with enormous conceptual clarity to help us to distinguish among forms of precarity, their social implications, and the particular ways in which precarity names a new form of power and potential for exploitation. Drawing on the history of political sovereignty, the Marxist idea of reproductive labour, a feminist critique of ideas of masculinity and independence, and an analysis of neoliberal forms of induced destitution, Lorey's work offers a historically and politically nuanced understanding of how new forms of power converge in the present time for new regulatory purposes. Whatever one might want to say about the transience or precarity of life itself, cast in existential terms, such claims are not separable from the social and economic organization of needs and, more particularly, the production of 'insecurity' for the purposes of extending securitarian forms of power. Lorey's work asks us to pay close attention to 'precarization' as a process that produces not only subjects, but also 'insecurity' as the central preoccupation of the subject. This particular form of power lays the groundwork for establishing the need for security as the ultimate political ideal, one that works to amass power within the state and corporate institutions at the same time that it produces a new kind of subject. In the place of critique and resistance, populations are now defined by their need to be alleviated from insecurity, valorizing forms of police and state control, promises of global investment, and institutions of global governance. Just as the

discourse of 'financial crisis' can and does work to shore up the need for greater managerial control of the market (and the need for an ever more expert set of capitalists), so the discourse of 'precarity' consolidates power among those who wield the power to alternate promise its alleviation and threaten its continuation.

Lorey's work involves a rethinking of the doctrine of sovereignty, offering an important reformulation of Agamben's recent views on the sovereign exception. Situating her analysis within a critique of liberal political philosophy and a revised conception of biopolitics, Lorey shows how sovereignty itself becomes an instrument in the regulation and self-regulation of populations. In fact, everyone is *prekarisiert* by the norms that govern the idea of sovereign citizens. Their sovereignty depends on the presumption that one's person or property is perpetually threatened by the outside, and that the exercise of sovereignty thus consists in a demand for security. In a sense, contemporary securitarian regimes govern populations (and are thus bound up with biopolitics) by amplifying and redefining this basic dynamic of 'defending against a threat' that defines liberal ideas of sovereign citizenship. Ironically, if not painfully, the idea of sovereignty implies precarization, which at once gives the lie to the traditional account of sovereign independence at the same time as it exposes its inner logic. In the terms of later modernity, the sovereign people, and the sovereign subject, are threatened by forms of illness, contagions of sexual panic, waves of criminality, possible invasions of many kinds. Thus, the need for immunization becomes paramount, and power takes the form of a subjugation by and through that need. On the one hand, the sovereign subject is markedly singular, and must be distinguished from the masses by individualization; and yet, the subject's relation to its own life is clearly managed by large scale forms of social and political regulation that it has adopted and now cultivates as its own practice of self-making. Indeed, the more the subject regulates him or herself, the more effectively does that broader form of regulation work – taking the form of a mode of self-management that takes for granted the individuality (and the need to cultivate the individuality) that is its very instrument.

This important book challenges us to imagine political mobilizations that would refuse the lure of 'being threatened' and take a critical distance from those forms of fearfulness that make us vulnerable to exploitation. In effect, Lorey asks us to think about the alternatives to accepting fear and insecurity as the basis for a political mobilization, alternatives to accepting deliberately induced states in which we seek security at all costs. What would it mean to focus instead on the induced character of precarity, and the exploitation of insecurity? Power is imposed on the subject, and yet power is the means by which the subject relates to itself and even cultivates itself. Thus, Lorey opposes a politics of pure victimization (that would see power as only imposed from the outside) as well as the ultimate value of 'security' (the affective investment of the regulated subject). Instead, she asks us to consider those forms of political mobilization that rally precarity against those regimes that seek to augment their power to manage and dispose of populations – in other words, precarity as activism. New governmental forms engaged in the precarization of populations work precisely through cultivating forms of subjectivation and practical possibilities (*Handlungsmöglichkeiten*) that can, and must be, undone through an activism of the precarious, one that combats the false promises of security, its managerial tactics, and its exploitations.

# The Government of the Precarious

## An Introduction

If we fail to understand precarization, then we understand neither the politics nor the economy of the present. Precarization is not a marginal phenomenon, even in the rich regions of Europe. In the leading neoliberal Western industrial nations it can no longer be outsourced to the socio-geographical spaces of the periphery where it only affects others. Precarization is not an exception, it is rather the rule. It is spreading even in those areas that were long considered secure. It has become an instrument of governing and, at the same time, a basis for capitalist accumulation that serves social regulation and control.

Precarization means more than insecure jobs, more than the lack of security given by waged employment. By way of insecurity and danger it embraces the whole of existence, the body, modes of subjectivation. It is threat and coercion, even while it opens up new possibilities of living and working. Precarization means living with the unforeseeable, with contingency.

In the secularized modernity of the West, however, being exposed to contingency is generally regarded as a nightmare, as a loss of all security, all orientation, all order. The monster of the bottomless pit can clearly no longer be really tamed even in the post-Fordist industrial nations of the 'West'. Fear of what is not calculable marks the techniques of governing and subjectivation, merging into an inordinate culture of measuring the immeasurable.

This leads to a form of governing that at least since Thomas Hobbes has been viewed as no longer possible: a government that is not legitimized by promising protection and security. Contrary to the old rule of a domination that demands obedience in exchange for protection, neoliberal governing proceeds primarily through social insecurity, through regulating the minimum of assurance while simultaneously increasing instability. In the course of the dismantling and remodelling of the welfare state and the rights associated with it, a form of government is established that is based on the greatest possible insecurity, promoted by proclaiming the alleged absence of alternatives. The way that precarization has become an instrument of government also means that its extent must not pass a certain threshold such that it seriously endangers the existing order: in particular, it must not lead to insurrection. Managing this threshold is what makes up the art of governing today.

Against this background, the question raised is not how to prevent and end the threat of precarity that is driving the disintegration of order. It is rather a matter of understanding how we are governed and keep ourselves governable specifically through precarization. In analyzing these techniques of governing, approaches that in various contexts imagine civil war, anomie or the possible break-up of society are of little help. The question is rather



where, within these governing mechanisms, cracks and potentials for resistance are to be found.

## (Self-)Government

The analysis of precarity that I develop in this book focuses on the term ‘government’. Michel Foucault has shown that ‘Western’ practices of governing can be traced back genealogically to Christian pastoral power. Already in this powerful prelude to modern *governmentality*, what is involved is an art of governing people, not things or territories. With the pastoral form of power, specific modes of individualization, including becoming a Westernmodern subject, are both condition and effect at the same time. Individualization means isolation, and this kind of separation is primarily a matter of constituting oneself by way of imaginary relationships, constituting one’s ‘own’ inner being, and only secondly and to a lesser extent by way of connections with others. Yet this interiority and self-reference is not an expression of independence, but rather the crucial element in the pastoral relationship of obedience.<sup>1</sup>

Corresponding practices of governing consequently consist in being led in one’s own conduct by others in precisely such a way as to produce relations to self that are then perceived, in the best case, as independent and autonomous. The art of governing generally consists in the ‘conduct of conducts’,<sup>2</sup> in influencing the conduct of others through the individualization. This does not, however, inevitably mean that individuals are trapped in a vicious circle between being guided by others and being self-guided. Numerous examples of ‘counter-conduct in the sense of struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others’<sup>3</sup> can already be found in the Middle Ages.

In the eighteenth century, pastoral power underwent a fundamental transformation: the laws to which people had to subject themselves were no longer laws of the king or the church, but rather the self-imposed laws of the citizens. This modern, male, bourgeois form of sovereignty required modes of subjectivation positioned ambivalently between self-determination and subjugation, between self-creation and obedience, between freedom and servility. For the modern citizen, if social and political conditions and one’s own life are perceived as capable of being arranged and influenced by one’s own (co-)decisions, the citizens – believing in collective, and thus implicitly their own, sovereignty, autonomy and freedom – voluntarily subject themselves to the conditions of society.

Yet modes of self-governing do not serve only to make oneself and others governable. At the same time, the potential emerges in them to no longer be governed in existing ways and even to be ever less governed. In the analysis of governing through insecurity, the government of the precarious, it is important to understand the actualization of this double ambivalence of governmentality under neoliberal conditions: the ambivalence between being governed by others and self-government, as well as the ambivalence *in* self-government between servile making-governable and refusals that aim to be no longer governed in this way. When we ask in this book why protests against government through insecurity are so difficult and rare, this means problematizing the obvious dominance of the servile side of precarious self-government. This side cannot be separated from the form of labour that is currently becoming hegemonic, one that demands the whole person, is primarily based on

communication, knowledge and affect, and becomes visible in a new way as virtuoso labour

## **Crisis of the Collective, Chances for the Common**

Since the formation of capitalist relations of production, there have been many for whom freedom of labour-power has not been a guarantee against existential vulnerabilities. Wage labour brought neither security nor independence.<sup>4</sup> Only collective welfare-state institutions that had to be fought for were able to ensure relative independence, essentially for the male breadwinner of the family. For this form of security, relational reproduction and care work had to be feminized, domesticated and devalued in its quality as labour.<sup>5</sup> However, the securing of predominately male independence had the advantage that the dependent workers could be organized and assembled for collective struggles.

With the neoliberal demolition and restructuring of collective security systems and the rise of short-term and increasingly precarious employment conditions, the possibilities for collectively organizing in factories or occupational groups are also eroded. New forms of individualization through employment have appeared, which are ever less capable, if at all, of being organized through traditional institutions of representations of interest. How can new practices of organizing that break through these forms of individualization be found today? How can a perspective on social and political conditions be developed that does not reject relationships, connections and dependencies among individuals, in other words, one that imagines and practises forms of self-reliance that start from connections with others?

This is possible when precarization is not perceived and combated solely as a threat, but when the entire ensemble of the precarious is taken into consideration and the current domination of securing functions and subjective experiences of precarization are taken as a starting-point for political struggles.

To understand precarization in this way, it is necessary to re-open the field of concepts of the precarious, following its constriction by French social-science usage since the early 1980s along with its entry into the corresponding debates in other languages.<sup>6</sup> If precarization is no longer limited to lack, coercion and fear, then the demand for a simple 'politics of deprecuarization'<sup>7</sup> no longer makes sense, as it seeks nothing other than the reformulation of traditional social-security systems. Politics of this kind would only be meaningful, in my view, if it could problematize and break through the hegemonic political and social-security logics of modern nation-states, if *precarity* and *precarization* could thus be analyzed in their functions as instruments of domination, and finally, if new modes of securing and protection against precarity and precarization could be found in the recognition of an ineluctable state of *precariousness*.

## **The Precarious and the Critique of Representation**

In the late 1990s both Pierre Bourdieu and Robert Castel, two of the most influential sociologists in the field of international precarization research, explicitly feared that collective resistance in the context of precarity would become impossible.<sup>8</sup> Castel took no

of the movements of the precarious in Europe, including the transnational EuroMayDay movement,<sup>9</sup> only marginally and relatively late, while Bourdieu was not even able to witness them.<sup>10</sup> He died in early 2002, less than a year after the first MayDay parade took place in Milan on 1 May 2001. On this traditional day of labour, not only do the heterogeneous precarious in many European cities problematize their situations and experiences, which often remain invisible in corporatist organizations, but, starting from political practices that critique identity and representation, they also seek new forms of organizing that are unorganizable.<sup>11</sup> Precarious working and living conditions are taken as the starting-point for political struggles, in order to find possibilities for political agency in neoliberal conditions.

What is unusual about these social movements is not only the ways in which new forms of political struggle are tested and new perspectives on precarization developed. They have also – and this is striking in relation to other social movements – repeatedly traversed and crossed the seemingly very separate fields of the cultural and the political. During the past decade, exchanges around the partly subversive knowledge of the precarious, in the communicative search for a common ground with a view to facilitating a political constituting, have frequently taken place less in political or even university contexts than in art institutions and social centres (as in Italy and Spain). This is only one aspect in the search for and invention of new modes of coming together and organizing, which have become difficult in the traditional forms, as Bourdieu and Castel rightly noted.

The precarious cannot be unified or represented, their interests are so disparate that classical forms of corporate organizing are not effective. The many precarious are dispersed both in relations of production and through diverse modes of production, which absorb and engender subjectivities, extend their economic exploitation, and multiply identities and work places. It is not only work that is precarious and dispersed, but life itself. In all these differences, the precarious tend to be isolated and individualized, because they do short-term jobs, get by from project to project, and often fall through collective social-security systems. There are no lobbies or forms of representation for the diverse precarious.

Yet this should by no means be understood solely as a lack, since it also holds out the opportunity to invent new and appropriate forms of political agency on the basis of precarious living and working conditions. The MayDay movements did not so much attempt to represent a collective subject of the precarious as to try out non-representational practices. In this respect, the movements of the precarious were the predecessors of the university occupations of 2008 and 2009, as well as of the current Occupy movements and their insistence on democracy beyond representation. Paolo Virno writes: 'It is typical of the post-Fordist multitude to foment the collapse of political representation: not as an anarchic gesture, but as a means of calmly and realistically searching for new political forms.'<sup>12</sup>

The different meanings of the concept of 'precarious' were repeatedly linked in the MayDay movements with the experiences of the individuals and with political practices. The Frassanito Network, in its definition of precarization, outlines the ambivalence of the term, particularly in the context of migration: 'Precarization thus symbolizes a contested field: a field in which the attempt to start a new cycle of exploitation also meets desires and subjective behaviors which express the refusal of the old, so-called Fordist regime of labour and the search for another, better, we can even say flexible life.'<sup>13</sup> In precarization a extreme degree of exploitation and a 'liberation' from traditional conditions of exploitation

bound up with the production apparatus of Fordism merge into new modes of subjectivation

### Three Dimensions of the Precarious

The conceptual composition of 'precarious' can be described in the broadest sense as insecurity and vulnerability, destabilization and endangerment. The counterpart of precarious is usually protection, political and social immunization against everything that is recognized as endangerment.<sup>14</sup> Historically, we owe political ideas of protection from insecurity not just to Hobbes' conception of a security state, in which the representing sovereign protects against the so-called natural state of man, inherent to which is the destruction of property and life by dangerous others. Protection from insecurity, from the precarious, has also been the responsibility of the welfare states of the twentieth century.<sup>15</sup> At the same time, neither Hobbes' Leviathan nor the welfare state prevents the precarious, they rather respectively engender new historical forms of precarity, new insecurities, from which they are again supposed to provide protection.

Those who are promised security are generally unable to develop free of concern about the threatening, precarized others; they are obligated to obedience and subordination. In a historically different way the precarious thus represent both the cause and the effect of domination and security.

However, when domination in post-Fordist societies is no longer legitimated through (social) security, and we instead experience governing through insecurity, then the precarious and the immune, insecurity and security/protection, stand ever less in a relation of opposition and increasingly take on a graded relationship in terms of a regulated threshold of being (still) governable. A crucial basis for this development is that precarization in neoliberalism is currently in a process of normalization, which enables governing through insecurity. In neoliberalism precarization becomes 'democratized'.

To further expand on all these theses, I distinguish between three dimensions of the precarious: *precariousness*, *precarity* and governmental *precarization*.

*Precairousness* – here I follow Judith Butler – is the term for a socio-ontological dimension of lives and bodies.<sup>16</sup> Precariousness is not an anthropological constant, a transhistorical state of being human, but rather a condition inherent to both human and non-human being. Above all, however, precariousness is not simply individual or something that exists 'in itself' in the philosophical sense; it is always relational and therefore shared *with* other precarious lives. Precariousness designates something that is existentially shared, an endangerment of bodies that is ineluctable and hence not to be secured, not only because they are mortal, but specifically because they are social. Precariousness as precarious 'being-with' in Nancy's sense is a condition of every life, producing very different variations historically and geographically.<sup>17</sup>

The second dimension of the precarious, *precarity*, is to be understood as a category of order, which designates the effects of different political, social and legal compensations of general precariousness. Precarity denotes the striation and distribution of precariousness in relations of inequality, the hierarchization of being-with that accompanies the processes of *othering*. This dimension of the precarious covers naturalized relations of domination, through



which belonging to a group is attributed or denied to individuals. Precarity involves social positionings of insecurity, yet it implies neither modes of subjectivation nor the power or agency of those positioned.

The third dimension of the precarious is the dynamics of *governmental precarization*. This relates to modes of governing since the formation of industrial capitalist conditions, and modern Western societies cannot be separated historically from the ideogeme of bourgeois sovereignty.

Although precariousness designates both a condition of life and the foundation of the social and the political, it was not until life entered politics – with the biopolitics that developed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as analysed by Foucault – that governing began to centre in a previously unknown way on preserving the life of each and every individual of a population, so as to strengthen the state and serve the productivity of the capitalist economy.<sup>18</sup> In the course of this new art of governing, governable biopolitical subjectivation emerged. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, biopolitical subjectivations increasingly intertwined with ideas of liberal bourgeois freedom and democratic self-determination.

Governmental precarization thus means not only destabilization through employment, but also destabilization of the conduct of life and thus of bodies and modes of subjectivation. Understanding precarization as *governmental* makes it possible to problematize the complex interactions between an instrument of governing and the conditions of economic exploitation and modes of subjectivation, in their ambivalence between subjugation and self-empowerment. Practices of self-empowerment do not automatically have an emancipatory effect, but are instead to be understood in a governmental perspective as thoroughly ambivalent. They can signify modes of self-government that represent a conformist self-development, a conformist self-determination enabling extraordinary governability. Practices of empowerment, however, can also break through, refuse, or escape from appeals to functional self-government.

In a governmental perspective, precarization can be considered not only in its repressively striating forms, but also in its ambivalently productive moments, as these emerge by way of techniques of self-government. In a historical era when contingency is not only subject to a new way to conditions of economic exploitation, the term *governmental precarization* can also cover a productive way of dealing with what is incalculable, with what cannot be measured or modularized, with what eludes government through insecurity.

None of the three dimensions of the precarious occurs individually, but rather in historically differently posited relations. Basically, it can be said of the relationship between precariousness and precarity that different forms of domination are thereby evoked. The socio-ontological level is constructed as a threat against which a political community must be protected, immunized. Legitimizing the protection of some generally requires striating the precarity of those marked as ‘other’. This especially distinguishes liberal governmentality to a high degree. The threatening precariousness can be turned into the construction of dangerous others, positioned respectively within and outside the political and social community as ‘abnormal’ and ‘alien’. In neoliberalism, as noted, precarization is currently undergoing a process of normalization in which, though the patterns of a liberal ordering of precarity continue to exist in a modified form, existential precariousness can no longer be entirely shifted through the construction of dangerous others and warded off as precarity; instead it

actualized in the individualized governmental precarization of those who are normalized under neoliberal conditions.

In my research on the government of the precarious, I am interested in developing a political and social theoretical perspective that starts from connectedness with others and takes different dimensions of the precarious into consideration. In light of the existential precariousness of every (living) being, understanding social relationality as primary does not mean starting from something that is equally common to all. Recognizing social relationality can only be the beginning of an entry into processes of becoming-common, involving discussions of possible common interests in the differentness of the precarious, in order to invent with others new forms of organizing and new orders that break with the existing forms of governing in a refusal of obedience.

Berlin, March 2011

---

1 Cf. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*, trans. Graham Burchell, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 207–8.

2 Michel Foucault, 'The Subject and Power', in James D. Faubion, ed., *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley, London: Penguin Press, 1994, pp. 326–48, here p. 341.

3 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 201.

4 Cf. Robert Castel, *From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question*, trans. Richard Boyd, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2003.

5 Cf. Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*, New York: Autonomedia, 2004.

6 See also Precarias a la deriva, 'Projekt und Methode einer "militanten Untersuchung". Das Reflektieren der Multitude in der 'actú', trans. Kathrin Held and Peter Tabor, in Marianne Pieper, Thomas Atzert, Serhat Karakayali and Vassilis Tsianos, eds., *Empire und die biopolitische Wende. Die internationale Diskussion im Anschluss an Hardt und Negri*, Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2007, pp. 85–108, here p. 93.

7 Klaus Dörre, 'Entsicherte Arbeitsgesellschaft. Politik der Entprekarisierung', *Widerspruch. Beiträge zu sozialistischer Politik* 49 (2005), pp. 5–18.

8 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, 'La précarité est aujourd'hui partout', in *Contre-feux. Propos pour servir à la résistance contre l'invasion néolibérale*, Paris: Liber – Raison d'Agir, 1998, pp. 95–101; Robert Castel, *L'insécurité sociale, Qu'est-ce qu'être protégé?*, Paris: Seuil, 2003, pp. 46–7.

9 For a brief history of the EuroMayDay movement, cf. Gerald Raunig, *A Thousand Machines: A Concise Philosophy of the Machine as Social Movement*, trans. Aileen Derieg, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2010, pp. 75–90.

10 Cf. Robert Castel, 'Die Wiederkehr der sozialen Unsicherheit', trans. Thomas Atzert, in Robert Castel and Klaus Dörre, eds., *Prekarität, Abstieg, Ausgrenzung. Die soziale Frage am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts*, Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2009, pp. 21–34. Here Castel mentions the French cultural workers or *Intermittents*.

11 Cf. *Kulturrisse. Zeitschrift für radikaldemokratische Kulturpolitik*: 'Organisierung der Unorganisierbaren' (April 2008), available at <http://kulturrisse.at>.

12 Paolo Virno, 'Publicness of the Intellect: Non-State Public Sphere and the Multitude', *transversal: 'Publicum'* (June 2008), available at <http://transversal.at>.

13 The Frassanito Network, 'Precarious, Precarization, Precariat?' (2005), available at <http://thistuesday.org>.

14 On the different dynamics of protection and threat that are covered in the term 'immunization', see Isabell Lorey, *Figuren des Immunen: Elemente einer politischen Theorie*, Zurich: Diaphanes, 2011.

15 Cf. Castel, *L'insécurité sociale*.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?*, London and New York: Verso, 2009; and Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*, London and New York: Verso, 2004.

---

<sup>17</sup> See Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1*, trans. Robert Hurley, London: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 141; Isabell Lorey, ‘Als das Leben in die Politik eintrat. Die biopolitisch-gouvernementale Moderne, Foucault und Agamben’, in Pieper et al., eds, *Empire und die biopolitische Wende*, pp. 269–92.

## Precariousness and Precarity

How can we understand, initially at a theoretical-systematic level, the connection between precarity as a relationship of inequality on the one hand, and existential, social precariousness on the other, the relationship between the first and the second dimension of the precarious? Judith Butler offers some considerations about this in her book *Frames of War*. Here she continues to pursue the political-philosophical question that was already raised in her book of essays, *Precarious Life*, as to when a life is considered grievable and therefore liveable. Within only a few pages, in the introduction to *Frames of War*, Butler introduces a second concept alongside precariousness: that of precarity,<sup>1</sup> adopting the neologism that has been used for several years now, especially in political-theoretical and activist discourses of precarization.<sup>2</sup>

Butler conceptualizes the general precariousness of life, the vulnerability of the body, not simply as a threat or a danger from which we have necessarily to be protected. She argues against reproducing the anxieties of precariousness and thus supporting traditional modern logics of domination, instead positing the lack of recognition of fundamentally precarious life as the starting-point for analysing relations of domination.

‘Precariousness’ as an existential state designates what constitutes life in general – both human and non-human. Butler formulates an ontology that cannot be understood apart from social and political conditions. These conditions enable historically specific modes of being, making it possible for bodies to survive in a certain way, which would not be viable without their being embedded in social, political and legal circumstances. At the same time, however, it is precisely these circumstances that endanger life. For this reason, according to Butler, it is important to focus on the political decisions and social practices through which some lives are protected and others are not.

Precariousness becomes ‘co-extensive’<sup>3</sup> at birth, since survival depends from the beginning on social networks, on sociality and the work of others. The fundamental social dependence of a living being due to its vulnerability, due to the impossibility of living a wholly autonomous life, also highlights – going beyond Butler – the eminent significance of reproductive work. Because life is precarious, it is crucially dependent on care and reproduction.

Precariousness relates not to life itself, but rather to the conditions of its existence;<sup>4</sup> what is problematized here is not what makes everyone the same, but rather what is *shared* by all. Precariousness that is shared by all can also be understood as a separating factor: on the one hand it is what we all have in common, but on the other it is what distinguishes and separates us from others. These two aspects of ‘shared/separated’ cannot be sharply differentiated, but



should instead be considered in their ambivalence. Sharing and separation have always already been inscribed in general and conditional precariousness: commonality and difference, conjunction and disjunction.

Precariousness is consequently neither an immutable mode of being nor an existential sameness, but rather a multiply insecure constituting of bodies, which is always socially conditioned. As that which is shared, which is at once divisive and connective, precariousness denotes a relational difference, a shared differentness. What is connective is not a pre-existing common good to which one could have recourse; instead it is something that is ontologically engendered in political and social agency.

Shared precariousness is thus a condition that both exposes us to others and makes us dependent on them.<sup>5</sup> This social interdependence can express itself both as concern or care and as violence. In other words: because they are precarious and hence finite, bodies are dependent on something outside themselves, 'on others, on institutions and on sustained and sustainable environments'.<sup>6</sup> Without protection, without security, without care no life can survive, and yet at the same time, it always remains exposed to risk and the danger of death. 'No amount of will or wealth can eliminate the possibilities of illness or accident for a living body', as Butler says.<sup>7</sup>

The assumption that life, because it is precarious and endangered, because it is exposed to an existential vulnerability, must be or even could be legally or otherwise entirely protected and secured, is nothing other than a fantasy of omnipotence.<sup>8</sup> *Although* they need protection, living bodies can never be completely protected, specifically because they are permanently exposed to social and political conditions, under which life remains precarious. The conditions that enable life are, at the same time, exactly those that maintain it as precarious. All security retains the precarious; all protection and all care maintain vulnerability; nothing guarantees invulnerability.

Shared precariousness as a relational difference does not exist beyond the social and the political. Therefore it does not exist independently from a second dimension of the precarious, namely that of hierarchizing precarity. This corresponds to a second form of difference: that of classifying and discriminating differentiation. Butler underscores the paradigmatic relationship between precariousness, precarity and domination in Western modernity. She emphasizes the break that Hobbesian state theory signified, conceiving commonly shared precariousness primarily as a threat: being anxious and frightened by others and by the vulnerability shared with them.<sup>9</sup> 'Yet, precisely because each body finds itself potentially threatened by others who are, by definition, precarious as well, forms of domination follow.'<sup>10</sup> Domination turns existential precariousness into an anxiety toward others who cause harm, who have to be preventively fended off, and not infrequently even destroyed, in order to protect those who are threatened.<sup>11</sup> The precariousness shared with others is hierarchized and judged, and precarious lives are segmented. This segmentation produces, at the same moment, the 'differential distribution'<sup>12</sup> of symbolic and material insecurities, in other words precarity. Precarity as the hierarchized difference in insecurity arises from the segmentation, the categorization, of shared precariousness. The classification of what is ineluctably shared produces inequality. Precarity can therefore be understood as a functional effect arising from the political and legal regulations that are specifically supposed to protect against general, existential precariousness. From this perspective, domination

means the attempt to safeguard some people from existential precariousness, while at the same time this privilege of protection is based on a differential distribution of the precarity of all those who are perceived as other and considered less worthy of protection.

---

<sup>1</sup> Butler, 'Precarious Life, Grievable Life', in *Frames of War*, pp. 25–6; for further considerations of precariousness and precarity, see also the interview with Judith Butler and Antke Engel, 'Politics under Conditions of Precariousness and Violence', in Marina Gržinić and Rosa Reitsamer, eds, *New Feminism: Worlds of Feminism, Queer and Networking Conditions* (Vienna: Löcker, 2008), pp. 135–46; Judith Butler, 'For and Against Precarity', *Tidal. Occupy Theory, Occupy Strategy* (December 2011), pp. 12–13, and 'Precarity Talk: A Virtual Roundtable', with Lauren Berlant, Judith Butler, Bojana Cvejic, Isabell Lorey, Jasbir Puar and Ana Vujanović, *Theatre Drama Review* 4 (2012), pp. 165–79.

<sup>2</sup> In discussions in the context of the European movement of the precarious (since 2001, the EuroMayDay movement) not only is the term 'precarization' (*Prekarisierung*) used in German, but also – often synonymously, without the differentiation developed here – 'precarity' (*Prekarität*) and 'precariat' (*Prekariat*) (cf. Raunig, *A Thousand Machines*, pp. 75–90). Even before Butler established the connection to political-theoretical and activist discussions about precarity herself, her concept of precariousness was already linked with precarity. (cf. Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter, 'From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again: Labour, Life and Unstable Networks', *Fibreculture* 5 (2005).

<sup>3</sup> Butler, 'Precarious Life, Grievable Life', p. 14.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 22–3.

<sup>5</sup> 'Although precarious life is a generalized condition, it is, paradoxically, the condition of being conditioned' (*ibid.*, p. 23).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p.18.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also Roberto Esposito, *Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community*, trans. Timothy Campbell, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> Butler, 'Precarious Life, Grievable Life', p. 31.

<sup>11</sup> Elsewhere I have called this kind of binary confirmation of domination *juridical immunity*. In this immunizing dynamic the precarious constructed as threat can be fended off to an 'outside'. However, the dangerous precarious can also be taken into a political community in the dynamic of *biopolitical immunization* and thus neutralized in their dangerousness and integrated – this dynamic of the immune corresponds more to normalized governmental precarization (cf. Lorey, *Figuren der Immunen*).

<sup>12</sup> Butler, 'Precarious Life, Grievable Life', pp. 25–7.

## Biopolitical Governmentality

In order to develop the third dimension of the precarious, governmental precarization, it is necessary first of all to describe the political-economic framework, which I call 'biopolitical governmentality'.<sup>1</sup> Michel Foucault uses the concept of 'governmentality' to designate the structural entanglement between the government of a state and the techniques of self-government in modern Western societies. This entanglement between state and population subjects can be regarded as *the* political and economic paradigm shift towards Western modernity.

What had been developing since the sixteenth century first came to fruition in the course of the eighteenth: a new governing technique, more precisely the lines of force of modern governing techniques up to the present. Neither the traditional sovereign, for which Foucault cites the sixteenth-century figure of Machiavelli's *Principe* as a prototype, nor Hobbes' voluntary community of subjects bound by contract, in the seventeenth century, were interested in leading the people for their own sake, but primarily in ruling them for the sake of the sovereign.<sup>2</sup> It was only in the course of the eighteenth century, as liberalism and the bourgeoisie became hegemonic, that the population came into the focus of power, and with this a mode of governing oriented to bettering the life of the people. For the strength of the state now no longer depended on the size of its territory or on the mercantilist and authoritative regimentation of subjects,<sup>3</sup> but rather on the 'happiness' of the population.<sup>4</sup>

Methods of governing continued to change in the course of the eighteenth century in the direction of a political economy of liberalism: a self-limiting of governing techniques in favour of a free market on the one hand and population-subjects on the other, who were bound in their thinking and their conduct to economic paradigms as well. These population subjects were not simply subjugated through repression and obedience, but instead became governable, as Foucault wrote in his lectures on governmentality, in so far as their numbers 'their longevity, health and ways of conducting themselves [had] complex and tangled relationships with these economic processes'.<sup>5</sup> Liberal modes of governing supplied the basic structure of modern governmentality, which has always been biopolitical.<sup>6</sup> In other words, liberalism provided the economic and political frame for biopolitics, just as biopolitics appeared as 'an indispensable element in the development of capitalism'.<sup>7</sup>

By the end of the eighteenth century, the strength and wealth of a state depended increasingly on the health of its population. Within a bourgeois-liberal framework, government policies with this orientation have meant, through to today, establishing, producing and then securing normality. To accomplish this, the first requirement was a large amount of data: statistics were prepared, the probabilities of birth and death rates calculated

along with frequencies of illnesses, housing conditions, nutrition, etc. However, this was not sufficient. To establish and maximize the health standards of a population requires productive biopolitical modes of governing that promoted life, as well as the active participation of every single individual, in other words: it required each individual's self-government.

In *The Will to Knowledge*, Foucault writes: 'Western man was gradually *learning* what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, forces that could be modified, and a space in which they could be distributed in an optimal manner.'<sup>8</sup> Foucault describes two things here that I think are important: 'Western man' has to learn to have a body that is not dependent on particular conditions of existence, which means he must learn that 'his precariousness assumes different extents that he can influence. Secondly, he has to learn to develop a relation to himself that is creative and productive, one in which it is possible to shape one's 'own' body, life and self, and thus also one's 'own' precariousness. Through attending to what is one's own, the ties to others are dissolved, relational difference segmented. Individualization is the precondition for the Western liberal governing of everyone's body and self.'<sup>9</sup> Biopolitical-governmental self-governing thus arises at those moments when the social conditions of the precariousness of the body and the whole of life are perceived by the individual as capable of being treated and formed. Indeed, these kinds of ways of self-governing strengthen fantasies of mastering one's 'own' precariousness as adept as possible. Philipp Sarasin shows how in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in the context of Western hygienic discourse, the belief emerged that 'it is largely up to the individual him- or herself to determine health, illness or even the time of death'.<sup>10</sup> This kind of imaginary self-sovereignizing refers to endeavours to overcome the contingency associated with the existential precariousness of life, and these kinds of endeavours never arise independently from governmental dispositives.

In the context of liberal-governmental self-techniques, the attribute 'one's own' always signifies a 'possessive individualism' in Macpherson's sense.<sup>11</sup> These kinds of self-relations oriented to the imagination of self, however, initially applied only to the bourgeois class before gradually extending to the entire population by the end of the nineteenth century. The issue here is not the legal status of the subject, but rather the structural conditions of normalizing societies: people must be capable of guiding themselves, of recognizing themselves as subjects of a sexuality, and learning to have a body that can remain healthy through diligence (nourishment, hygiene, housing conditions) or become ill due to lack of diligence. Specific self-techniques need to be developed, with the help of which the conditions of precariousness can be influenced. In this sense, the entire population must become biopolitical subjects.<sup>12</sup> Biopolitics strives to reduce the vulnerability of an existential precariousness by way of specific techniques of self-formation, in order to ensure on average an economically productive life for the population.

With reference to workers, imaginary self-relations<sup>13</sup> of this kind mean that one's own body is imagined as the property of the self; it is 'one's own' body that has to be sold as labour-power. In this respect as well, the modern 'free' individual is forced to participate in reproducing him or herself through powerful self-relations, making a good sale of the labour-power in order to be able to live, and live increasingly better, in order to reduce

precariousness.

In modern societies, therefore, the 'arts of governing'<sup>14</sup> – what Foucault also called 'governmentality' – do not consist primarily in being repressive, but rather in an 'internalized self-discipline,<sup>15</sup> a mode of self-control that always serves to regulate 'one's own precariousness.

As early as the second half of the seventeenth century, John Locke – who according to Marx demonstrated that 'the bourgeois way of thinking is the normal human way of thinking'<sup>16</sup> – wrote in his *Two Treatises of Government* that man is 'master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it'.<sup>17</sup> For bourgeois man, as a precondition for his formal freedom as citizen – as well as for the worker who, with the freedom of wage labour, possesses and must sell his labour-power – property took on a supposedly 'anthropological significance'<sup>18</sup> at the beginning of modernity. This in turn seemed to be the precondition for the individual to become independent and detached from the traditional system of subordination and security; detached, in other words, from the relative security of his precariousness at the price of unfree obedience and dependency.

In a biopolitical perspective, however, the significance of property transcends the limited levels of citizenship, capital and wage labour, and has rather to be understood in its full generality. For bodily property relations are regarded as governmental (*gouvernementale*) self-government in a biopolitical dispositif for the entire population, not only for the male citizen or worker. Modern self-relations are based structurally, beyond just an economic appeal, on a relation to one's own body as means of production. Accordingly, possessive individualist self-relations imply notions of 'one's own' precariousness that can be arranged for security according to class- and gender-specific positions, as well as ethnic, racialized, sexualized and religious attributions – starting from and in relation to a national and male heterosexual norm.

Mastery of one's self and one's property is fundamental to historically specific, male connoted ideas of autonomy and freedom. Here the fact of being connected with others and shared precariousness comes to the fore; in bourgeois society, beginning in the eighteenth century, this tends to shift from 'one's own' into an area of the 'other', in the private sphere and with a female connotation. The governmental masculinist way of managing 'one's own' precariousness through the security of property – which in bourgeois understanding also includes wife, children and servants – began to spread to the working class as a materializing ideology in the early twentieth century, with Henry Ford's introduction of the family wage. Specifically, this meant, on the one hand, the gender-specific division of labour in production work and, on the other hand, the reproduction work in the household that secured wage labour, but was also devalued and unpaid at the same time.<sup>19</sup>

Normalizing self-government is based on an imagination of coherence, identity and wholeness that goes back to the construction of a male, white, bourgeois subject. Coherence is in turn one of the preconditions for modern sovereign subjects. 'Inner', 'natural' truths imagined in this way, constructions of authenticity of this kind, continue up to the present to nourish notions of being able to live one's life freely, autonomously and according to one's own decisions, in other words being sovereign. These kinds of biopolitical-governmental power and domination relationships are not easily perceived, because they frequently appear as sovereign, self-made, free decisions, or as personal insights, and even today they produce



the desire to ask, 'Who am I?' or 'How can I fulfil myself?' The concept of one's own responsibility, so frequently invoked in the course of neoliberal restructuring, functions in the tradition of this liberal technique of self-government.

In this widely understood sense of the economy and biopolitics, the lines of self-marketin labour-power, of entrepreneurs of the self as a mode of subjectivation, reach back to the beginnings of modern liberal societies and are not an entirely neoliberal phenomenon.<sup>20</sup> From a perspective of this kind, today's appeal to individual responsibility appears to repeat something that had already failed to function in the nineteenth century, namely the primacy of property and the construction of security on this basis. At the beginning of bourgeois rule property was appealed to and deployed as protection against the imponderables of social conditioned existence, as security against a vulnerability deriving from the secularized community and the rule of princes and kings. Ultimately, this was only valid for a few, and by the end of the nineteenth century the nation-state had to guarantee social security for many citizens.

## The Ambivalence of Biopolitical-Governmental Self-Governing

Foucault speaks of a cover-up, and this is probably one of the most important ideological achievements of liberal governmentality: the ambivalence between empowerment and subjugation perceived as an ongoing paradox. The sovereign was beheaded in the French Revolution, yet sovereignty and its theorizations still remain extremely functional for the new, modern technique of governing, though now no longer as describing a relationship between sovereign and subject that covers the entire political and social body. With the end of aristocratic rule, there was a transfer of juridical sovereignty from the king to the so-called 'people', in other words to the individual male citizens who were considered as making up the nation. By means of state sovereignty, the citizen could now 'exercise his or her sovereign rights'.<sup>21</sup> But this 'democratization of sovereignty', collectively expressed as 'sovereignty of the people', is not the outstanding achievement of bourgeois domination. An assessment of this kind covers up and 'conceals' the fact that this democratic sovereignty 'was heavily ballasted by the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion',<sup>22</sup> as Foucault writes.

The ambivalence between self-legislation and coercion was already pointed out by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his writing on the *Social Contract*. In their sovereignty, the self-governing citizens should also be subjects at the same time. 'The essence of the political body consists in the concurrence of obedience and freedom', according to Rousseau.<sup>23</sup> It is only in the simultaneity of subjugation and freedom, of regulation and empowerment, that the governability or self-governability of sovereign bourgeois subjects is achieved. Even today, however, this bourgeois-democratic mode of becoming a subject is not apprehended as constituting ambivalence, but rather as a paradox, as though simultaneous subjugation and empowerment was unimaginable. Yet in the eighteenth century, the Western citizen had not emancipated himself from subjugation and constituted himself as sovereign. The old relationship between sovereign and subject was instead shifted 'into him', resulting in the fundamental tension of biopolitical governmental subjectivation.

Although Foucault sees this tension and even relates it to the new art of governmentality,

the way he problematizes sovereignty always remains bound up with rights (and the subjects), rather than being linked with imaginations of the capability for self-creation, coherence and autonomy as condition and effect of biopolitical governmental subjectivation.

The ambivalence of the constitution of Western modern subjects is not based solely on a particular conception of citizenship. Biopolitical-governmental subjectivation in general modes of self-governing in normalizing societies – takes place according to the same seemingly paradoxical logic as affects citizens as (legal) subjects, in other words between subjugation and empowerment. With the biopolitical demand to orient oneself to what is normal, *everyone* had to develop a relation to *themselves*, to control their own bodies, their own lives, by regulating themselves and thus conducting themselves. Despite all individual differences, this demand for self-regulation in both the private and the public sphere was fundamental, both in the family and in the factory or in politics.

It is particularly because techniques of self-government emerge from the simultaneity of subjugation and empowerment, from the ambivalence of coercion and freedom, that in this seemingly paradoxical movement the individual becomes not only a subject, but also a specific, modern, 'free' subject. 'Power', according to Foucault, 'is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are "free".'<sup>25</sup> Freedom arises from the governmental 'art of governing':<sup>26</sup> 'Freedom ... is never anything other than a relation between the governing and the governed.'<sup>27</sup> The problematization of governmental techniques of governing does not centre on the question of the regulation of autonomous, free subjects, but rather on that of regulating the relationships by which the so-called autonomous and free subjects first become such at all.

What distinguishes liberal forms of governmentality is that the governability of each and every individual within a population always also becomes possible through the way in which they conduct themselves. The art of governing, according to Foucault, consists in conducting conduct. The power of governing is not just exercised repressively from above. Instead liberal governmental (*gouvernementale*) governing entails individuals having an active influence on the actions of others, on the possibilities of conduct.<sup>28</sup> Subjectivized in this way this subject then recurrently participates in the (re-)production of the conditions for governmentality, because it is in this scenario that the possibilities of agency first arise.

Individuals moving in power relations, by which they are guided and governed, are always subjects who act, subjects capable of acting.<sup>29</sup> In acting, they participate in the manner in which they are governed. Modern subjects embody liberal-democratic modes of governing through self-government, through the way they live. Participation is the 'motor' of the governmental biopolitics, yet not in the conventional sense as political participation, but rather as fundamental participation through self-government. It is precisely through the way they conduct themselves, how they govern themselves, that individuals become amenable to social, political and economic steering and regulation. However, the active participation of each individual in the reproduction of governing techniques never serves only subjugation. Self-conduct does not necessarily have to comply with the dominant discipline and subordination. In the ambivalence between subjugation and empowerment, self-government can always enable immanent struggles over the manner of leadership as well.<sup>30</sup> Reducing self-government to mechanisms of subjugation would mean failing to recognize this ambivalence and obscuring contradictions, social struggles, and potentials for resistance.

Liberal governmentality needs not only a certain form of freedom, but also at the same time mechanisms of security, of ensuring.<sup>31</sup> The two, freedom and security, mutually prevent their absoluteness; a certain insecurity is immanent to liberal modes of governing, not least of all due to this dynamic. The impossible protection from precariousness finds an equivalent in governmental conceptions of security, which calculate a remainder of risk both politically and economically.<sup>32</sup> A welfare-state protection against certain existential dangers and risks is nevertheless possible – even if, so far, it has never been possible for everyone.

## Protection and Inequality

Within the framework of its welfare-state paradigm of protection, liberal governmentality was based on multiple forms of precarity as inequality through *othering*: on the one hand, on the unpaid labour of women in the reproduction area of the private sphere; on the other hand, on the precarity of all those excluded from the nation-state compromise between capital and labour – whether as abnormal, foreign or poor – as well as those living under extreme conditions of exploitation in the colonies.<sup>33</sup> All those who did not meet the norm and normalization of the free, sovereign-bourgeois, white subject, along with his concomitant property relations, and all those who threatened this norm, were precarized. Western modernity, along with its conceptions of sovereignty and biopolitics, is unthinkable without a ‘political culture of danger’,<sup>34</sup> without the permanent endangerment of the normal, without imaginary invasions of constant, everyday threats such as illness, filth, sexuality, criminality or the fear of ‘racial’ impurity, which must be immunized against in various ways.<sup>35</sup> The presumed paradox of biopolitical governmentality is evident here in a further aspect: the mode of governing makes it possible, as Cornelia Ott has aptly phrased it, ‘for human beings to learn to consider themselves as unique “subjects”, while uniting them at the same time as an amorphous, standardized “population mass” ... The reverse side of the “right to life” here is always the exclusion or destruction of life.’<sup>36</sup>

The liberal mode of governing produces precarities as economic, social and legal relations of inequality through systematic categorizations and hierarchizations according to ‘body’ and ‘culture’. In this sense I use precarity as a structural category of ordering segmented relations of violence and inequality. This dimension of structural inequality, however, is missing in Foucault’s conception of governmentality.<sup>37</sup>

Helped by a hierarchizing and discriminating culture of danger, the contradictions of liberal political economy are reinforced in the interplay between freedom and security, self-empowerment and compulsion. As an immanent contradiction of liberal governmentality, precarized deviance has repeatedly distorted and disturbed the stabilizing dynamics between freedom and security and has frequently triggered collective counter-behaviour and struggles.

From the nineteenth century on, hegemonic economic modes of subjectivation and self-government were not practised in liberal-capitalist societies independently from social protection techniques and institutions. The latter were intended to reduce social insecurity and keep the risk of unemployment, illness, accident and social exclusion calculable for an increasing number of the national population.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, the institutions of the welfare state did not primarily serve the protection and security of the workers, but rather



- [\*\*download Get Off Your Ass and Run!: A Tough-Love Running Program for Losing the Excuses and the Weight pdf\*\*](#)
- [10 Secretos para conseguir el Éxito y la paz interior for free](#)
- [download online Compassion and Solidarity: The Church for Others here](#)
- [read online Loneliness Trilogy Bundle Boxset \(Play With You, Embrace You, Be With You\)](#)
- [The Last Song pdf, azw \(kindle\), epub, doc, mobi](#)
- [501 Spanish Verbs \(6th Edition\) \(Barron's Foreign Language Guides\) online](#)
  
- <http://patrickvincitore.com/?ebooks/Get-Off-Your-Ass-and-Run---A-Tough-Love-Running-Program-for-Losing-the-Excuses-and-the-Weight.pdf>
- <http://anvilpr.com/library/10-Secretos-para-conseguir-el---xito-y-la-paz-interior.pdf>
- <http://www.celebritychat.in/?ebooks/Ancient-Mesopotamia-at-the-Dawn-of-Civilization--The-Evolution-of-an-Urban-Landscape.pdf>
- <http://aseasonedman.com/ebooks/The-Good-Father.pdf>
- <http://conexdx.com/library/Sexing-the-Body--Gender-Politics-and-the-Construction-of-Sexuality.pdf>
- <http://bestarthritiscare.com/library/Man-Made--A-Stupid-Quest-for-Masculinity.pdf>